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a b s t r a c t 
Context: State-of-the-art works on automated detection of Android malware have leveraged app descrip- 
tions to spot anomalies w.r.t the functionality implemented, or have used data ﬂow information as a 
feature to discriminate malicious from benign apps. Although these works have yielded promising perfor- 
mance, we hypothesize that these performances can be improved by a better understanding of malicious 
behavior. 
Objective: To characterize malicious apps, we take into account both information on app descriptions, 
which are indicative of apps’ topics, and information on sensitive data ﬂow, which can be relevant to 
discriminate malware from benign apps. 
Method: In this paper, we propose a topic-speciﬁc approach to malware comprehension based on app 
descriptions and data-ﬂow information. First, we use an advanced topic model, adaptive LDA with GA, to 
cluster apps according to their descriptions. Then, we use information gain ratio of sensitive data ﬂow 
information to build so-called “topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures”. 
Results: We conduct an empirical study on 3691 benign and 1612 malicious apps. We group them into 
118 topics and generate topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signature. We verify the effectiveness of the topic-speciﬁc 
data ﬂow signatures by comparing them with the overall data ﬂow signature. In addition, we perform a 
deeper analysis on 25 representative topic-speciﬁc signatures and yield several implications. 
Conclusion: Topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures are eﬃcient in highlighting the malicious behavior, and 
thus can help in characterizing malware. 
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
The momentum of smart mobile devices carries along an im- 
pressive number of malicious apps which pose serious threats to 
users. Indeed, malware can lead to damages of varying severity, 
ranging from spurious app crashes to ﬁnancial losses with mal- 
ware sending premium-rate SMS, as well as to private data leaks. 
To devise tools and techniques that are eﬃcient in detecting mal- 
ware, researchers and practitioners require, more than ever, exten- 
sive knowledge of malicious behavior and how they can be char- 
acterized [1] . 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: zdyxl@zju.edu.cn (X. Yang), davidlo@smu.edu.sg (D. Lo), 
li.li@uni.lu (L. Li), xxia@zju.edu.cn (X. Xia), tegawende.bissyande@uni.lu (T.F. Bis- 
syandé), jacques.klein@uni.lu (J. Klein). 
Research on automated detection of malware in the Android 
ecosystem has produced numerous approaches [2–4] in the last 
years. Among those approaches, Gorla et al. have proposed to clus- 
ter apps according to their description, and then to use anomaly 
analysis techniques on the functionality implemented to identify 
malicious apps within each cluster [5] . More recently, Avdiienko 
et al. have devised an approach to identify malware by using pat- 
terns of sensitive data ﬂows to discriminate malicious from be- 
nign apps [6] . While both approaches have shown promising re- 
sults, they do not exploit any understanding of malicious behavior 
in their detection schemes. 
In this work, we consider a related but different problem than 
those studies about malware detection. We aim at understanding 
malware traits. Although malware detection is a very meaningful 
task since it can help automatically detect malware for users, mal- 
ware characterization goes further since it can also help people 
aware of why an app is malware. To achieve the target, we raise 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infsof.2017.04.007 
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two questions. What may cause an app being malicious? Does the 
apps of different topics have different causes for being malicious? 
To answer the above two questions, we focus on associating 
description information of apps with their data ﬂow information 
to characterize malicious behavior. we propose a topic-speciﬁc ap- 
proach which combines description and sensitive data ﬂow infor- 
mation. In a ﬁrst step, we group different apps into several top- 
ics according to their descriptions. To that end, we leverage an 
adaptive Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) with Genetic Algorithm 
(GA) [7] which allows to select the appropriate number of topics to 
optimally group apps. In a second step, for each topic, we collect 
the sensitive data ﬂow information from the associated apps. Each 
piece of sensitive data ﬂow information is weighted according to 
the number of times it appears in benign apps and in malicious 
apps, to yield an information gain ratio [8] value. 
With this approach, we generate a so-called “topic-speciﬁc data 
ﬂow signature”. This signature is a list of data ﬂow patterns along 
with their importance, represented by the information gain ratio, 
to discriminate malicious apps from benign apps. Building topic- 
speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures presents three advantages compared 
to a generic (overall) data ﬂow signature: (1) each topic-speciﬁc 
signature will include fewer, speciﬁc, data ﬂow patterns; (2) each 
data-ﬂow signature contains more discriminative information to 
identify malicious apps in a speciﬁc topic; (3) each data ﬂow signa- 
ture characterizes more ﬁne-grained behavior of malicious apps in 
this topic by highlighting the speciﬁc data-ﬂow patterns that they 
are prone to exhibit. 
We implemented our approach and conducted an experimen- 
tal assessments based on 5303 apps (3691 benign and 1612 mali- 
cious). We have crawled descriptions of apps from Google Play Store 
and Best Apps Market 1 for benign and malicious apps respectively, 
and leveraged MUDFLOW [6] to collect data ﬂow information from 
all the apps. We group all the apps into 118 topics and generate 
topic-specif ic data ﬂow signatures. We verify the effectiveness of 
the topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures by comparing them with the 
overall data ﬂow signature. Moreover, we perform a deeper anal- 
ysis on several representative topic-speciﬁc signatures and yield 
several implications. In conclusion, topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signa- 
tures can help better characterize malware. 
The main contributions of this paper are: 
1. We propose a topic-speciﬁc approach to generate data ﬂow sig- 
natures. The topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures is much better 
than the overall data ﬂow signatures to characterize malware. 
2. We conduct an empirical study to demonstrate the beneﬁts of 
topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures and perform a deeper analy- 
sis on several representative topic-speciﬁc signatures. 
In the remainder of the paper, we provide background informa- 
tion (cf. Section 2 ), present our approach (cf. Section 3 ) and exper- 
iments (cf. Section 4 ) before discussing related work (cf. Section 5 ) 
and giving concluding remarks (cf. Section 6 ). 
2. Background 
We introduce Android malware and overview some details on 
data ﬂow information in Section 2.1 . Section 2.2 provides back- 
ground details on the working of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) 
which we leverage in our work. At last we present the motivation 
of our work. 
2.1. Malicious apps and data ﬂow information 
Malicious apps (or malwares) are apps that implement func- 
tionalities which contradict with app user interests. Generally, mal- 
1 http://www.bestappsmarket.com/. 
Fig. 1. The graphical model of LDA. 
wares, which include viruses, worms, trojans and spyware, are 
harmful at diverse severity scales. 
Nowadays, there are more and more malicious apps that leak 
user’s sensitive data without user’s permission. These sensitive 
data include for example user’s location, text message records, 
and even contact information. Usually, such malicious apps can be 
identiﬁed by manually checking their implementation code. In a 
previous work, Avdiienko et al. have identiﬁed malware by ana- 
lyzing sensitive data ﬂows between source and sink API calls [6] . 
A source is a method that accesses personal data such as ac- 
count, unique device ID, and location. A sink is a method that can 
transmit local data to an external entity such as network, ﬁle and 
log. They demonstrated that it is possible to identify malware by 
simply inspecting whether a sensitive user data (e.g., account) is 
leaked from its source to an unsafe sink (e.g., network). To simplify 
the detection of leaks between sources and sinks, Adviienko et al. 
have regrouped the large number of sensitive Android APIs into a 
set of 34 semantic categories detailed in Table 1 . Following Advi- 
ienko et al., we leverage the 34 provided categories in our work to 
simplify and record data ﬂow information. 
2.2. Latent Dirichlet allocation 
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [9] is a well-known topic 
model used for various tasks of software engineering re- 
search [7,10,11] . In particular, many studies about malware detec- 
tion leverage LDA [5,12,13] . In the graphical model of LDA repre- 
sented in Fig. 1 , a circle represents a variable, an arrow represents 
a dependency between two variables and a rectangle represents a 
process which is repeated a number of times. 
K denotes the number of topics, D denotes the number of docu- 
ments and N the number of terms in a document. Generally, D and 
N are ﬁxed by the problem, while K needs to be speciﬁed manu- 
ally. Two other parameters must also be tuned carefully: 
1. alpha , which affects the topic distribution of the documents 
(i.e., descriptions). A higher alpha leads to more uniform dis- 
tribution of the topics per document. By default, alpha is set to 
0.1. 
2. Beta , which affects the term distribution of the topics. A higher 
beta leads to more uniform distribution of the terms per topic. 
By default, beta is set to 0.01. 
In theory, LDA is a generative probabilistic model, which as- 
sumes that the data (a collection of documents) is generated based 
on a certain statistical process for each document d and each topic 
k . Speciﬁcally, LDA contains three steps: 
1. Step 1: LDA generates a topic distribution vector theta and a 
term distribution vector phi based on two Dirichlet distribu- 
tions [14] deﬁned by the parameters alpha and beta , respec- 
tively. 
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Table 1 
Sensitive API categories. 
Categories Description 
Source only 
ACCOUNT_INFORMATION APIs to read details of user’s online accounts. 
BLUETOOTH_INFORMATION APIs to read Bluetooth communication settings and state, along with information about connected and connecting devices. 
CONTENT_RESOLVER APIs to read contents of a given URI. 
DATABASE_INFORMATION APIs to read data from database and retrieve database metadata. 
EMAIL_INFORMATION APIs to read emails and email settings. 
FILE_INFORMATION APIs to obtain URI of resources stored in either internal or external storage devices. 
HARDWARE_INFO APIs to read device’s hardware information. 
LOCATION_INFORMATION APIs to read geographical information. 
NETWORK_INFORMATION APIs to read network, telephony and connection settings. 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE Non-sensitive source APIs. 
PHONE_INFORMATION APIs to read other phone related information. 
UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER APIs to read device’s and user’s identiﬁers, e.g., device id, subscriber id, etc. 
VOIP_INFORMATION APIs to obtain VOIP settings and state. 
Sink only 
ACCOUNT_SETTINGS APIs to modify user’s account settings. 
BLUETOOTH APIs to send information using Bluetooth service. 
EMAIL APIs to send emails. 
EMAIL_SETTINGS APIs to modify email settings. 
FILE APIs to write data to ﬁles or other resources. 
INTENT APIs to start, fragment and manage Android’s activity. 
LOG APIs to send data, warnings, and error messages to be logged. 
NETWORK APIs to modify network settings, e.g., WiFi settings, etc. 
NO_SENSITIVE_SINK Non-sensitive sink APIs. 
PHONE_CONNECTION APIs to modify phone connection settings. 
PHONE_STATE APIs to modify phone state. 
SYNCHRONIZATION_DATA APIs to manage synchronization operation. 
VOIP APIs to send data through VOIP. 
Both 
AUDIO APIs to manage volume, ringer, and other audio-related settings. 
BROWSER_INFORMATION APIs to manage browser bookmarks and data. 
CALENDAR_INFORMATION APIs to manage date and time related information. 
CONTACT_INFORMATION APIs to manage device’s central repository containing data about people (e.g., their phone numbers). 
IMAGE APIs to manage metadata of image (e.g., JPEG) ﬁles. 
NFC APIs to manage communication to NFC tag. 
SMS_MMS APIs to manage SMS and MMS operations such as reading and sending text, reading and sending multimedia, etc. 
SYSTEM_SETTINGS APIs to manage device and system conﬁgurations such as password, performance counters, web settings, etc. 
2. Step 2: LDA generates a topic assignment vector z to assign each 
term in a document a speciﬁc topic according to the topic dis- 
tribution vector of the document theta . 
3. Step 3: LDA generates each term in a document with the topic 
distribution vector phi and the topic assignment vector z . 
By repeating step 1 K times, K topics are generated. By repeat- 
ing step 2 and 3 N times, a document having N terms is generated. 
By repeating step 1 to 3 D times, a collection of D documents is 
generated. 
In practice, LDA takes a document-by-term ( D ∗N ) matrix a as 
input, and outputs two matrices b and c , i.e., document-by topic 
( D ∗K ) matrix and topic-by-term ( K ∗N ) matrix. The document-by- 
term matrix a can be a term frequency matrix, in which a ij rep- 
resents the number of times that the j th term appears in the i th 
document. In the document-by-topic matrix b, b ij represents the 
probability of the i th document belongs to the j th topic. Generally 
a document is regarded as belonging to the topic with the highest 
probability. In the topic-by-term matrix c, c ij represents the proba- 
bility that the j th term belongs to the i th topic. Likewise, we assign 
a term to the topic with the highest probability and then we can 
conclude what a topic is about by looking up the terms it contains. 
To some extent, LDA can be seen as a clustering algorithm. By 
assigning a speciﬁc topic for each document using document-by- 
topic matrix, a clustering of documents can be completed. 
There are several implementations for LDA in the literature. 
In our work, we use an implementation based on collapsed 
Gibbs sampling. This approach achieves the same accuracy as the 
standard LDA implementation while being faster in each execu- 
tion [15,16] . Besides the three parameters, alpha, beta and K in- 
troduced above, our implementation is tuned with a parameter m 
for the number of Gibbs sampling iterations. m is defaultly set to 
20 0 0. 
2.3. Motivation 
We envision our work can give a deeper insight into mal- 
ware compared with the studies which generate signatures with- 
out taking into account the speciﬁcities of different topics of mal- 
ware [17–19] . Indeed, since different apps provide different func- 
tionality, building a generic (overall) signature of malware across 
the various topics of apps may not be optimal. For example, most 
apps which track user’s real-time location are likely malicious. Tak- 
ing this information to build an overall signature may lead to false 
positives in the case of navigation apps which benignly, and on 
purpose, must track user’s location and may even save this sensi- 
tive information outside the app (e.g., in a log ﬁle). 
Topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures can beneﬁt security experts 
who may use them to characterize malicious apps and build 
signature-based approaches to malware detection. Users, when 
provided with such information, can also understand the risk that 
they take in installing a given app. Finally, app developers, based 
on such signatures, can learn to avoid unorthodox implementations 
which may make their apps easily assimilable to malware. 
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Table 2 
An example of how a data ﬂow pattern is generated. 
Source API Uri.getQueryParameter() 
Source API category NETWORK_INFORMATION 
Sink API Log.e() 
Sink API category LOG 
Data ﬂow pattern NETWORK_INFORMATION → LOG 
3. Case study setup 
In this section, we describe the details of the setup of our em- 
pirical experiments. We ﬁrst detail the data collection and prepro- 
cessing step in Section 3.1 , and then we present our experimental 
approach in Section 3.2 . 
3.1. Data collection 
As we introduced earlier, our topic-speciﬁc approach is per- 
formed on top of two basic artifacts: the sensitive data ﬂow in- 
formation and the descriptions of Android apps. We collect them 
based on static analysis. To collect the sensitive data ﬂow informa- 
tion of Android apps, we leverage in our work an existing dataset, 
which is previously published by Adviienko et al. [6] , containing a 
set of Android apps and their sensitive data ﬂow patterns. Those 
sensitive data ﬂow patterns are extracted through a well-known 
state-of-the-art tool called FlowDroid [20] . Table 2 shows an ex- 
ample of how a data ﬂow pattern is generated. As previously intro- 
duced in Section 2 , the source and sink APIs in the data ﬂow pat- 
tern (showed in the ﬁrst and third rows) are represented through 
their corresponding semantic categories (showed in the second 
and fourth rows). Operator → indicates data ﬂow direction. There- 
fore, the data ﬂow pattern means that the app calls a source API 
in the NETWORK_INFORMATION category to generate data and this 
data is passed to a sink API in the LOG category (which means the 
data is logged somewhere). 
The second artifact we need to collect is the descriptions of An- 
droid apps that are going to be investigated. However, it is not 
trivial to collect the descriptions of a given set of Android apps, 
especially for malicious apps as they are unlikely to be available 
on popular app markets, such as the Google Play store, from which 
we are only able to collect descriptions of benign apps. To this end, 
we ﬁrst manually searched descriptions for a set of Android apps 
then come to a semi-automatic approach based on the knowledge 
learned from the manual process. The semi-automatic approach at- 
tempts to crawl as much descriptions as possible from a set of pre- 
deﬁned app markets, such as Best Apps Market . 2 
Actually, Adviienko et al. [6] have only made available the MD5 
names of their Android apps. It is nearly impossible to search 
descriptions of a given app through its MD5 information. Thus, 
there is a need to obtain the unique name of a given Android app 
through its MD5 information. Again, this is not trivial as well. We 
thus come to a work around approach: at ﬁrst, we collect a big 
data set of malicious Android apps from VirusShare, 3 and then we 
consider only such apps that exist in both Adviienko’s dataset and 
our downloaded dataset. The unique app name is further retrieved 
from the downloaded apps. 
Totally, we collect 5303 apps, including 3691 benign and 1612 
malicious apps, for which we could get both their descriptions 
and sensitive data ﬂow patterns. And there are totally 128 differ- 
ent data ﬂow patterns appearing in these apps. Note that the ra- 
tio of benign apps over malicious ones is about 2.3, which mim- 
2 http://www.bestappsmarket.com/. 
3 https://virusshare.com/. 
Table 3 
The data ﬂow information of one benign app 
(com.phoneapps99.unblockyoutube) and one malicious app 
(VirusShare_57e868d46163387793fd3e260ed56ac4). 
App Data ﬂow information 
Unblockyoutube NETWORK_INFORMATION → LOG 
(Benign) NETWORK_INFORMATION → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 
DATABASE_INFORMATION → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → INTENT 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → LOG 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → FILE 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → SYSTEM_SETTINGS 
VirusShare NETWORK_INFORMATION → SMS_MMS 
(Malicious) NETWORK_INFORMATION → INTENT 
NETWORK_INFORMATION → LOG 
NETWORK_INFORMATION → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → LOG 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → INTENT 
Fig. 2. The overall framework of our approach. 
ics the ratio of benign and malicious apps in the real world. 4 Also 
note that a given app can have several sensitive data ﬂow patterns, 
while different apps may exhibit a same data ﬂow pattern. As an 
example, Table 3 illustrates the sensitive data ﬂow patterns col- 
lected from a benign and a malicious apps, where a sensitive data 
ﬂow pattern, named NETWORK_INFORMATION → LOG , is actu- 
ally shared by both of these two apps. 
3.2. Data analysis 
We now detail our topic-speciﬁc approach. In particular, we 
ﬁrst present an overview of our data analysis framework. Then, we 
depict in detail the implementation of each important step of our 
framework. 
3.2.1. Overall framework 
Fig. 2 presents the overall framework of our proposed two- 
phase topic-speciﬁc approach. During the app clustering phase, 
apps are clustered according to the topics inferred from their de- 
scriptions using LDA. During the data ﬂow signature generation 
4 We estimate the ratio of benign and malicious apps using the AndroZoo project 
( https://androzoo.uni.lu/markets ) [21] , in which there are currently over 5 million 
Android apps and the goodware/malware ratio is 2.36. 
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phase, we build a topic-speciﬁc signature of apps using the sen- 
sitive data ﬂow information which differentiates benign from ma- 
licious apps in that topic. 
In Step 1, we ﬁrst extract a number of features from app de- 
scriptions. These features are selected as representative terms that 
are useful in building a good topic model. In our work, we extract 
the representative terms and use their term frequency as features 
(cf. Section 3.2.2 ). Next, in Step 2, we build a topic model with 
the extracted features using adaptive LDA with Genetic Algorithm 
(GA). GA is used to determine the optimal number of topics (cf. 
Section 3.2.3 ). At the end of this step, LDA clusters the different 
apps into their corresponding topics. 
Once all apps have been grouped in different topics, we gen- 
erate, in Step 3, a topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signature per topic by 
computing information gain ratio of each piece of data ﬂow in- 
formation. For each piece of data ﬂow information in a topic, we 
ﬁrst count the number of times it appears in benign apps with this 
topic and the number of times it appears in malicious apps with 
this topic. We then compute the information gain ratio of the piece 
of data ﬂow information accordingly (cf. Section 3.2.4 ). In the end, 
each topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signature consists of data ﬂow pat- 
terns along with their likelihood to appear in benign and malicious 
apps estimated through the information gain ratio . 
3.2.2. Feature extraction – text preprocessing 
In general, an app description provides raw information for its 
use and functionality. To cluster apps with LDA, we preprocess 
the descriptions as many prior work did [9,22,23] . To the pur- 
pose, we use the python package NLTK. 5 NLTK is a leading platform 
for building Python programs to work with natural language data. 
With the help of NLTK, we ﬁrst tokenize all the terms (i.e., words) 
from the descriptions. We then remove the stop words, numbers, 
punctuation marks and other non-alphabetic characters since they 
add little value to the topic. To further reduce the noises and fea- 
ture dimensions, we also remove the terms that do not exist in the 
English vocabulary of NLTK. 6 Subsequently, we use the Snowball 
stemmer [24] to transform the remaining terms to their root forms 
(e.g., reading and reads are reduced to) to unify similar words into 
a common representation. Finally, we compute the term frequency- 
inverse document frequency (tf-idf) value for each stemmed term. 
At the end of these steps, an app description d is represented 
as a term frequency vector, i.e., d = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n ) , where w i de- 
notes tf-idf value of the i th term (i.e., the number of times the i th 
term appears in the description d divided by the number of de- 
scriptions in which such a term appears). In total, there are 8832 
different stemmed terms extracted from all the app descriptions. 
Note that we do not do any word ﬁltering since LDA itself is a fea- 
ture reduction algorithm which has been proved to be better than 
traditional information retrieval algorithm tf-idf. 
3.2.3. App clustering – adaptive LDA with genetic Aagorithm 
As mentioned in Section 2 , we use LDA to cluster apps into dif- 
ferent topics. In LDA, the number of topics k is an undetermined 
but important parameter. An overly large or overly small value of 
k may inﬂuence the performance of our approach severely. There- 
fore, we use an adaptive LDA technique, leveraging Genetic Algo- 
rithm (GA), to optimize the value of k . 
Genetic algorithms simulate evolutions by natural selec- 
tion [25] . In GA, the parameters waited to be searched are encoded 
as an individual “chromosome” and a so-called ﬁtness function is 
pre-deﬁned. The ﬁtness function is used to evaluate the different 
parameter conﬁgurations by generating different ﬁtness values. As 
5 http://www.nltk.org/. 
6 http://www.nltk.org/ . 
a start, a population of randomly-generated chromosomes are initi- 
ated, where each of them represents a random parameter conﬁgu- 
ration. Then, the population will evolve a number of generations to 
search for an optimal parameter conﬁguration. For each generation, 
the population goes through three phrases: selection, crossover 
and mutation. In the selection phrase, the different chromosomes 
are selected by a selection probability, which is transformed from 
their corresponding ﬁtness values. The higher the ﬁtness value is, 
the higher the selection probability is. In the crossover phrase, the 
selected chromosomes are paired in a random way and each pair 
of chromosomes are crossed over to generate a new pair of chro- 
mosomes by a crossover function and crossover rate. In the mu- 
tation phrase, the new generated chromosomes are mutated ran- 
domly by a mutation function and a mutation rate. After the afore- 
mentioned three phrases, the whole population is updated and be- 
comes a new generation. With the generations evolving, better and 
better individuals (with higher ﬁtness values) will emerge. There- 
fore, with the help of GA, we can obtain a proper value of k . 
Algorithm 1 The GA Process in Adaptive LDA. 
1: Input: The population size, p; 
The number of generations, n ; 
The search scope of the number of topics k , [ min, max ] ; 
2: Output: The number of topics, k _ best; 
3: Pick p random values of number of topics, from the range 
[ min, max ] , using an initialization function. Denote them as k ; 
4: For each value k i , compute the Silhouette coeﬃcient as its ﬁt- 
ness value; 
5: According to the ﬁtness value, use a selection function to select 
better values in k ; 
6: Cross over selected values using a crossover function to gener- 
ate new values. Denote them as k _ new ; 
7: Mutate some values in k _ new using a mutation function, and 
replace k with these values; 
8: Repeat Steps 4 to 7 n times and output the value k _ best with 
the best ﬁtness value; 
Algorithm 1 presents the GA process in adaptive LDA. In our 
work, our LDA–GA approach is implemented on top of Pyevolve, 7 
an evolutionary computation framework. For the encoding scheme, 
we use the classical chromosome representation: 1D Binary String. 
That is, we represent k in the binary system (i.e., “10 0 0 01” rep- 
resents 33 as the value of k ). We set the length of each bi- 
nary string as 7 since 7 bits is likely to be suﬃcient for the 
maximum number of topics (“1111111” can reach 127). We use 
the default function G1DBinaryStringInitializator , which is the only 
initialization function for binary strings and can randomly gen- 
erate binary strings. For the selection phase, we use the func- 
tion GRankSelector , which is a rank-based selector. We choose it 
since it behaves in a more robust manner than proportional se- 
lector, c.f., [26,27] ). For the crossover phase, we use the function 
G1DBinaryStringXUniform and use the default crossover rate (i.e., 
0.9). G1DBinaryStringXUniform performs crossover uniformly, and it 
is proposed by Syswerda [28] . We choose it since it helps to re- 
duce the bias associated with the length of the binary representa- 
tion used [28] . For the mutation phase, we use the default func- 
tion G1DBinaryStringMutatorFlip and use the default mutation rate 
(i.e., 0.02). G1DBinaryStringMutatorFlip is the classical ﬂip mutator, 
which randomly perform bit inversion (0 to 1 or 1 to 0) in a bi- 
nary string. Finally, we set p as 20, which results from the tradeoff
of good results and execution time needed. We set n as 10 since 
we ﬁnd the ﬁtness value becomes stable within 10 generations. 
7 http://pyevolve.sourceforge.net/. 
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For the ﬁtness function, we follow Panichella et al.’s work on 
LDA–GA [7] and use the Silhouette coeﬃcient as the ﬁtness value. 
The Silhouette coeﬃcient is ﬁrst proposed by Kogan [29] and is a 
common evaluation metric for clustering [30–32] . The computation 
of the Silhouette coeﬃcient consists of three steps: 
1. Step 1: For a document d i , we calculate the maximum Eu- 
clidean distance from d i to the other documents in the same 
cluster, which is denoted as a( d i ). And we calculate the mini- 
mum Euclidean distance from d i to the centroids of the other 
clusters (i.e., the clusters that do not contain d i ), which is de- 
noted as b( d i ). 
2. Step 2: Given a( d i ) and b( d i ), we can calculate the Silhouette 
coeﬃcient S( d i ) for the document d i according to the following 
formula: 
S(d i ) = 
b(d i ) − a (d i ) 
ma x ( a ( d i ) , b( d i )) 
3. Step 3: We compute the mean value of all S( d i ) as the overall 
Silhouette coeﬃcient. 
The scope of the Silhouette coeﬃcient is in [ −1,1]. A bigger 
value of the Silhouette coeﬃcient indicates a better clustering. 
When a value of number of topics achieves a high Silhouette coef- 
ﬁcient, it means that the value leads to a good result for LDA. The 
higher Silhouette coeﬃcient a value achieves, the more likely it is 
to be kept in the evolution process. Therefore, by using the adap- 
tive LDA with GA, we can ﬁnd a proper number of app topics and 
we assign each app a speciﬁc topic according to its description. 
3.2.4. Data ﬂow signature generation – information gain ratio 
Information gain ratio is a ratio of information gain to the in- 
trinsic information, in which the “intrinsic information” represents 
the initial information entropy. It has been used in many malware 
detection studies [33–36] . In our work, information gain ratio can 
indicate what percentage of information a data ﬂow pattern can 
gain from the intrinsic information. Therefore, we use information 
gain ratio to evaluate each data ﬂow pattern and generate a topic- 
speciﬁc data ﬂow signature per topic. A topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow 
signature is a list of data ﬂow patterns that appear in apps of the 
corresponding topic, where each pattern is associated with an in- 
formation gain ratio value indicating its power to discriminate ma- 
licious from benign apps. 
To compute information gain ratio, we ﬁrst calculate informa- 
tion gain IG . For each topic, we denote the number of malicious 
apps of the topic as P , and that of benign apps of the topic as 
N . For each data ﬂow pattern in a topic, we denote the number 
of times it appears in the malicious apps of the topic as pos and 
that in the benign apps of the topic as neg , respectively. We also 
denote total , which is equal to pos + neg, as the number of times 
it appears in all the apps of the topic. Then, the information gain 
IG ( d ) of a data ﬂow pattern d can be calculated as follows: 
IG (d) = E(P, N) − (total/ (P + N)) × E(pos, neg) 
− (1 − total/ (P + N)) × E(P − pos, N − neg) , 
where 
E(x, y ) = −(x/x + y ) × log(x/x + y ) − (y/x + y ) × log(y/x + y ) . 
In the above formula, E denotes the information entropy and log 
is on the base of 2. When x equals to y, E will achieve the maxi- 
mum value (i.e., 1). When either neg or pos equals to zero, E will 
achieve the minimum value (i.e., 0). The information gain IG ( d ) is 
the difference of three information entropies (i.e., the intrinsic in- 
formation entropy E ( P, N ) and two information entropies generated 
by splitting an attribute), and thus its value is above 0 and below 
E ( P, N ). 
Since different topics have different intrinsic information en- 
tropy E ( P, N ), directly comparing IG ( d ) of different topics is unrea- 
sonable. Therefore, we divide them by E ( P, N ) to normalize them, 
which leads to information gain ratio Ratio : 
Ratio(d) = IG (d) 
E(P, N) 
. 
The value range of Ratio is in [0, 1], with which each data ﬂow 
pattern can be well investigated. If Ratio is 0, it means that the 
data ﬂow pattern cannot differentiate malicious apps from benign 
apps, since the pattern cannot decrease the information entropy. If 
Ratio is 1, it means that the data ﬂow pattern is a excellent indica- 
tor which can completely discriminate malicious apps from benign 
apps, since the pattern gains all the intrinsic information. More- 
over, the bigger the Ratio is, the better is the data ﬂow pattern to 
be an indicator. 
4. Case study 
We ﬁrst enumerate research questions in Section 4.1 to as- 
sess the suitability of our approach. We then present experimen- 
tal results on the case study of Android malware in Section 4.2 , 
and summarize the ﬁndings before discussing threats to validity in 
Section 4.4 . 
4.1. Research questions 
We consider the following research questions for assessing the 
eﬃciency of the proposed approach to enable better characteriza- 
tion of malicious apps. 
RQ-1: What is the distribution of malicious/benign apps over dif- 
ferent topics? 
With the ﬁrst research question we aim to investigate the dis- 
tribution of malicious/benign apps over different topics. The dis- 
tribution of malicious/benign apps over different topics can inﬂu- 
ence the effectiveness of topic-speciﬁc malware characterization. If 
a topic contains much more malware than benign apps (or much 
more benign apps than malwares), it indicates that topic-speciﬁc 
malware characterization is effective. On the contrary, if a topic 
contains almost equally malicious and benign apps, it indicates 
that topic-speciﬁc malware characterization is not useful. We use 
the proportion of malicious apps Proportion as the evaluation met- 
ric. Speciﬁcally, given a speciﬁc topic t , number of malicious apps 
in t is mal , and number of benign apps in t is ben, Proportion is 
deﬁned as follows: 
P roportion = mal/ (mal + ben ) . 
RQ-2: Are topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures effective? 
We then investigate the effectiveness of topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow 
signatures. To that end, we compare topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow sig- 
natures with the overall data ﬂow signature (i.e., the data ﬂow 
signature derived by investigating benign apps and malicious apps 
without considering their respective association in topics). We use 
information gain ratio, which is introduced in Section 3.2.4 , as the 
evaluation metric. Note that for the overall data ﬂow signature, the 
calculation of information gain ratio is based on all apps we in- 
vestigate without considering their different topics. Since a signa- 
ture contains many data ﬂow patterns (each with an information 
gain ratio), we report the distributions of information gain ratio 
for each topic-speciﬁc signature, and use statistical tests to demon- 
strate whether topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures are substantially 
and statistically signiﬁcantly better than the overall data ﬂow sig- 
nature in terms of information gain ratio. 
RQ-3: What can we learn from topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures? 
In the last research question, we go further by making a more 
in-depth qualitative analysis on several topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow sig- 
natures. We discuss the data ﬂow patterns in several topic-speciﬁc 
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Fig. 3. Distribution of Apps in topics (ordered by number of apps). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the web version of 
this article.) 
Table 4 
The top ten representative terms and corresponding assigned names for example 
topics. 
Assigned name Top-10 terms (After stemming) 
Body building Weight bodi help track lose calcul health easi reach 
Sport live Sport live footbal leagu world match manag interact varieti 
Puzzle game Game puzzl play fun brain match bubbl easi solv 
Weather forecast Weather clock forecast day current hour locat temperatur 
wind 
Protector Secur devic protect mobil safe phone android block data 
Reader Read book reader bibl free day write content digit 
News News latest inform access break sport world read oﬃci 
Timer Screen touch set alarm button timer volum start turn 
Calendar Day time calendar daili week month import everi year 
Power management Batteri phone power speed memori manag save charg run 
Kid education Kid fun learn child educ help littl babi age 
App launcher Theme launcher design appli android phone open choos 
rate 
Cloud storage Manag ﬁle android zip cloud devic copi server storag 
Camera Photo camera effect share galleri add editor sticker creat 
Flash player Flash player free adob auto angri grand citi play 
Music player Music song listen player audio play equal artist album 
Social app Chat peopl date meet free singl proﬁl send connect 
Wallpaper Wallpap live free screen home set beauti background menu 
Video player Video watch player movi play android content best music 
Navigator Travel navig traﬃc job rout avail map time trip 
Browser Browser brows android fast best speed dolphin histori 
search 
Network shopping Shop buy product price sell trade offer differ purchas 
Financial Card scan money code manag busi credit use expens 
Dictionary English word learn dictionari translat languag vocabulari 
pronunci use 
Screen locker Lock screen password unlock devic hide phone use set 
signatures. We aim to conclude several implications and better 
characterize malicious apps based on topic-speciﬁc signatures. 
All experiments for answering the above research questions 
were conducted on an Intel(R) Core(TM) T6570 with 2.10 GHz CPU 
and 4 GB RAM PC running Windows 7 (64-bit). 
4.2. Experiment results 
RQ-1: What is the distribution of malicious/benign apps over dif- 
ferent topics? 
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3 , we ﬁrst use the adaptive LDA 
with GA to ﬁnd an optimal number of topics k . Since GA is a ran- 
domized algorithm and as such it may return different results over 
different runs, we run GA 10 times to reduce the bias. As a result, 
the mean of k is 117.7, the median of k is 119 and the standard 
deviation of k is 7.31. We use the mean of k rounded up to the 
nearest integer (i.e., 118) as the number of topics to input to LDA. 
Table 4 presents 25 representative example topics of the LDA re- 
sult. We list the top 10 representative stemmed terms, and infer a 
summarizing name for each topic. From the table, we can see that 
our approach can cluster apps into distinct categories well. Each 
set of top-10 stemmed terms is related to a speciﬁc topic differ- 
ent from the rest. This result supports the feasibility of generating 
topic-speciﬁc signatures. 
Each topic includes a number of apps, some benign and others 
malicious. Fig. 3 shows the distribution of apps (green for benign 
and red for malicious) in the 118 topics. 
From Fig. 3 , we can ﬁnd that malicious and benign apps are 
not equally distributed across topics. Some topics tend to con- 
tain more benign apps while others tend to contain more mali- 
cious apps. Speciﬁcally, among 118 topics, there are 38 topics that 
have Proportion over 80% or below 20%. For example, based on the 
dataset, “Flash Player” and “Wallpaper” apps include signiﬁcantly 
more malware than benign apps (with Proportion of 87 and 62%), 
while apps for “Dictionary” and “Weather Forecast” are on the op- 
posite end of the spectrum (with Proportion of 12 and 12%). This 
suggests that, to some extent, malware writers favor a few top- 
ics of apps more and thus demonstrates the suitability of topic- 
speciﬁc malware analysis. 
Malicious and benign apps are not equally distributed over 
different topics and some topics tend to contain more benign 
apps while others tend to contain more malicious apps, which 
indicates the suitability of topic-specific malware analysis. 
RQ-2: Are topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures effective? 
To show the effectiveness of topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures, 
we compare topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures with the overall 
data ﬂow signature based on information gain ratio. Figs. 4 –6 
present the distributions of information gain ratio for all topic- 
speciﬁc signatures and the overall signature. From the ﬁgures, we 
can see that all topic-speciﬁc signatures are above the overall sig- 
nature. For the average information gain ratio (of all the data ﬂow 
patterns in one signature), topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures are 
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Fig. 4. Distribution of information gain ratios for all topic-speciﬁc signatures (Part1). 
Fig. 5. Distribution of information gain ratios for all topic-speciﬁc signatures (Part2). 
in the range of [0.02, 1], while the overall signature is only 0.008. 
Moreover, among the 118 topic-speciﬁc signatures, there are 7 sig- 
natures which contain at least one data ﬂow patterns whose infor- 
mation gain ratio values achieve 1, which means these 7 signatures 
can correctly and totally distinguish malicious apps from benign 
ones of the corresponding topics. These ﬁndings suggest that topic- 
speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures have better quality than the overall 
data ﬂow signature and can help characterize malicious apps bet- 
ter. 
To better demonstrate the superiority of the topic-speciﬁc data 
ﬂow signatures, we perform statistical tests by comparing all in- 
formation gain ratios (with each corresponding to a data ﬂow pat- 
tern) in a topic-speciﬁc signature with those in the overall signa- 
ture. Note that we perform the statistical analysis in the topic-level 
rather than in the app-level; this is the case since we generate a 
signature for each topic instead of each app. In particular, we per- 
form the Wilcoxon rank sum test (with Benjamini–Hochberg Cor- 
rection) to compute the p -value, and also compute the Cliff’s delta. 
Wilcoxon rank sum test is often used to check if the difference 
in two data groups is statistically signiﬁcant (which corresponds 
to a p-value of less than 0.05) or not. Cliff’s delta is often used 
to check if the difference in two data groups is substantial. The 
range of Cliff’s delta is in [ −1, 1], where −1 or 1 means all values 
in one group are smaller or larger than those of the other group, 
and 0 means the data in the two groups is similar. The mappings 
between Cliff’s delta scores and effectiveness levels are shown in 
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Fig. 6. Distribution of information gain ratios for all topic-speciﬁc signatures (Part3). 
Fig. 7. Distribution of p -values and Cliffs deltas for all topic-speciﬁc signatures compared to the overall signature. 
Table 5 
Mappings of Cliff’s delta values to their 
interpretations [37] . 
Cliff’s delta ( δ) Interpretation 
−1 < = δ < 0.147 Negligible 
0.146 < = δ < 0.33 Small 
0.33 < = δ < 0.474 Medium 
0.474 < = δ < = 1 Large 
Table 5 . By computing the p-value and Cliffs delta, the extent of 
which the topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures improves over the 
overall data ﬂow signature can be more rigorously assessed. 
Fig. 7 presents the distributions of p -values and Cliffs deltas 
for all topic-speciﬁc signatures compared to the overall signature. 
From the ﬁgures, we can see that all p -values are less than 0.05 
and all Cliffs deltas are above 0.5 (which is large). Therefore, we 
can conclude that topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures are better 
than the overall data ﬂow signature substantially and statistically 
signiﬁcantly in terms of information gain ratio. 
The topic-specific data flow signatures are effective. Statistical 
tests have shown that all the topic-specific data flow signa- 
tures are better than the overall data flow signature substan- 
tially and statistically significantly in terms of information gain 
ratio. 
RQ-3: What can we learn from topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures? 
In total, the overall data ﬂow signature contains 128 unique 
data ﬂow patterns. On the contrary, the topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow 
signatures have much less patterns. The smallest signature con- 
tains only 16 patterns, and the biggest signature contains no more 
than half of all the data ﬂow patterns (i.e., 61). In addition, the 
topic-speciﬁc signatures contains an average of 34 patterns, which 
is about 1/4 of all the data ﬂow patterns. 
Although the topic-speciﬁc signatures contain fewer data ﬂow 
patterns, we assume their patterns are more discriminative since 
these patterns are restricted to a speciﬁc topic. In addition, a re- 
duced number of data ﬂow patterns to inspect increases charac- 
terization eﬃciency by leading to a concise report. Therefore, we 
make a more in-depth qualitative analysis to investigate each data 
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Table 6 
Data ﬂow patterns in the topic-speciﬁc signature for “Flash Player”. 
Data ﬂow patterns Information gain ratio 
NETWORK_INFORMATION → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 0.6369 
UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 0.4287 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → NETWORK 0.3516 
LOCATION_INFORMATION → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 0.2616 
CALENDER_INFORMATION → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 0.2127 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → FILE 0.2127 
CONTENT_RESOLVER → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 0.2127 
DATABASE_INFORMATION → INTENT 0.1812 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → INTENT 0.14 4 4 
FILE_INFORMATION → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 0.1320 
ACCOUNT_INFORMATION → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 0.1320 
Table 7 
Data ﬂow patterns in the topic-speciﬁc signature for “Wallpaper”. 
Data ﬂow Information gain ratio 
UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 0.4106 
LOCATION_INFORMATION → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 0.3129 
NETWORK_INFORMATION → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 0.2622 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → NETWORK 0.1838 
ACCOUNT_INFORMATION → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 0.1559 
Table 8 
Data ﬂow patterns in the topic-speciﬁc signature for “Weather Forecast”. 
Data ﬂow patterns Information gain ratio 
DATABASE_INFORMATION → FILE 0.2736 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → AUDIO 0.1539 
UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 0.1415 
UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER → LOG 0.1379 
NETWORK_INFORMATION → LOG 0.1369 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → NETWORK 0.1360 
NETWORK_INFORMATION → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 0.1353 
UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER → INTENT 0.1308 
ﬂow pattern in the topic-speciﬁc signatures. Due to space con- 
straints, we present analysis for three representative topics, namely 
“Flash Player”, “Wallpaper” and “Weather Forecast”. 
For the signature in “Flash Player” topic, there are totally 24 
distinct data ﬂow patterns, 11 of which can gain at least 10% of 
the intrinsic information. For the signature in “Wallpaper” topic, 
there are totally 36 distinct data ﬂow patterns, 5 of which can 
gain at least 10% of the intrinsic information. And for the signature 
in “Weather Forecast” topic, there are totally 53 distinct data ﬂow 
patterns, 8 of which can gain at least 10% of the intrinsic informa- 
tion. Tables 6 –8 enumerate those data ﬂow patterns for the three 
topic-speciﬁc signatures, respectively. From the tables, we can con- 
clude several points. 
First, different topic-speciﬁc signatures have different relevant 
data ﬂow patterns. For example, 5 out of 8 patterns are exclusive 
for the topic “Weather Forecast”. Spreading different relevant pat- 
terns to different topics can much reduce the number of data ﬂow 
patterns in a topic-speciﬁc signature and better characterize mal- 
wares. As a result, it is possible to immediately identify the mali- 
ciousness of an app by inspecting only the small number of rele- 
vant patterns instead of all patterns (such as 128 patterns in our 
dataset). 
Second, even the same data ﬂow patterns have different 
capabilities for different topic-speciﬁc signatures. For example, 
the pattern UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 
is the most discriminative pattern for the topics “Flash Player”
and “Wallpaper”, but not for the topic “Weather Forecast”. The 
most discriminative pattern for the topic “Weather Forecast”, 
DATABASE_INFORMATION → FILE , does not even appear in 
the other two topics. 
Table 9 
The exclusive data ﬂow patterns of one benign 
app (com.devexpert.weather) and one malicious app 
(VirusShare_aea02d6d5afbba7c0411b9a0f58b8256). 
App Exclusive data ﬂow patterns 
Benign FILE_INFORMATION → INTENT 
FILE → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → SYSTEM_SETTINGS 
Malicious LOCATION_INFORMATION → LOG 
DATABASE_INFORMATION → LOG 
NETWORK_INFORMATION → LOG 
UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 
CONTENT_RESOLVER → NO_SENSITIVE_SINK 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → FILE 
NO_SENSITIVE_SOURCE → NETWORK 
As a showcase of malware characterization, we also investigate 
two apps in “Weather Forecast” topic: com.devexpert.weather which 
is benign and VirusShare_aea02d6d5afbba7c0411b9a0f58b8256 
which is malicious. For the data ﬂow information, the benign app 
has 9 sensitive data ﬂow patterns and the malicious app has 13 
sensitive data ﬂow patterns, among which they have 6 mutual pat- 
terns. We list the exclusive data ﬂow patterns of the two apps in 
Table 9 . From the table, we can see that the 3 exclusive data ﬂow 
patterns from the benign app seem quite normal. However, the 7 
exclusive data ﬂow patterns from the malicious app are suspect. 
The ﬁrst three of them are about leaking location, database and 
network information into log ﬁles, while another data ﬂow exists 
for sending apparently non sensitive data (which may include log 
data) via the network. The combination may suggest to an analyst 
a malicious behavior that tracks and leaks user data. 
In summary, building topic-speciﬁc signatures can be seen as 
dimension reduction of features which can contribute to faster and 
clearer decision on malware classiﬁcation, since the topic-speciﬁc 
signatures include fewer but more relevant data ﬂow patterns. In- 
deed, every data ﬂow pattern is a feature for learning. Following 
the signature information, one can select the data ﬂow patterns 
that have big information gain ratio values as features for mal- 
ware classiﬁcation, since they are the ones which better discrim- 
inate malicious apps from benign apps better. 
The topic-specific data flow signatures contain fewer but more 
relevant data flow patterns which can gain much more in- 
formation about differentiating malicious apps from benign 
ones. Therefore, the topic-specific data flow signatures can 
help characterize malicious apps better. 
4.3. Threats to validity 
Threats to internal validity relate to randomness and errors in 
our experiments. First, GA is a randomized algorithm and as such it 
may return different LDA conﬁgurations over different runs. There- 
fore, we run GA 10 times and use the average result as the ﬁnal 
number of topics for LDA. Second, LDA is a probabilistic topic mod- 
els, which means that it may return different topics in different 
executions. The randomness can be reduced substantially when a 
suﬃciently large number of Gibbs sampling iterations (i.e., m men- 
tioned in Section 2.2 ) is employed. We have tried various values of 
m and found 20 0 0 to be a proper value that can generate stable re- 
sults with acceptable running time. Setting m as 20 0 0, we run LDA 
10 times and we ﬁnd that the differences are minimal. We also 
ﬁnd that larger values of m have little inﬂuence to the results. In 
addition, we have double checked our implementations and all the 
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Table 10 
The top ﬁve representative terms and corresponding assigned 
names for example topics. 
Our topics Google Play topics 
Body building Health & ﬁtness 
Sport live Sports 
Puzzle game Puzzle 
Weather forecast Weather 
Protector Tools 
Reader Tools 
News News & magazines 
Timer Tools 
Calendar Events 
Power management Tools 
Kid education Education 
App launcher Tools 
Cloud storage Tools 
Camera Photography 
Flash player Tools 
Music player Music& audio 
Social app Communication 
Wallpaper Art & design 
Video player Video players & editor 
Navigator Maps & navigation 
Browser Tools 
Network shopping Shopping 
Financial Finance 
Dictionary Books & reference 
Screen locker Tools 
experiment results. Hence, we believe there are minimal threats to 
internal validity. 
Threats to external validity relate to the generalizability of our 
results. We have evaluated our approach on 5303 apps, containing 
3691 benign apps and 1612 malicious apps. Although the number 
of apps is quite high, it is still not guaranteed that they are repre- 
sentative enough. In the future, we plan to reduce this threat fur- 
ther by analyzing more representative apps and ensure that each 
topic contain signiﬁcant number of samples. 
4.4. Discussion 
We also compare the topics generated by our approach with 
the topics (i.e., categories) used by Google Play. Table 10 presents 
the 25 example topics generated by our approach and their corre- 
sponding Google Play topics. We can note several points. First, our 
topics and Google Play topics share common topics. For example, 
both Google Play and our topics contain “Puzzle Game”, “Naviga- 
tor”, “Video Player”, etc. Second, our topics are in a ﬁner granular- 
ity compared to Google Play topics. For example, Google Play has 
a topic named “Tools”, in which it includes protectors, power man- 
agement tools, ﬂash player, browser, etc. 
Unfortunately, we cannot compute information gain ratios using 
categories from Google Play. We crawl benign apps from Google 
Play and malicious apps from Best Apps Market (i.e., http://www. 
bestappsmarket.com/ ). We do so since most apps in Google Play 
are clean – a similar assumption was made in prior studies [ 38 , 
39 ] – and Google Play quickly deletes malicious apps. As a result, 
we do not have the Google Play categories of the malicious apps. 
5. Related work 
In this paper, we leverage an advanced topic model called adap- 
tive LDA with GA to perform topic-speciﬁc malware comprehen- 
sion. State-of-the-art works that relate to this one are mainly in 
two folds: malware identiﬁcation and topic model based investiga- 
tion. 
5.1. Malware identiﬁcation and detection 
The most related works to ours are the recent studies con- 
ducted by Gorla et al. [5] and Avdiienko et al. [6] . Gorla et al. 
propose an approach called CHABADA, which is dedicated to iden- 
tify malicious apps [5] through app descriptions. They ﬁrst clus- 
ter different apps according to their descriptions, and then use 
anomaly analysis technique to identify outliers with respect to 
their API usage. However, they only consider the APIs that are 
governed by user permissions, which may consequently result in 
false negatives and false positives, as APIs are too coarse to rep- 
resent the apps’ behavior. Avdiienko et al. thus propose another 
approach called MUDFLOW to mitigate this limitation, which uses 
sensitive data ﬂows rather than APIs to better exploit the infor- 
mation of apps’ API usage [6] . Those sensitive data ﬂows are col- 
lected by MUDFLOW through a well-known static taint analysis 
tool named FlowDroid [20] . With the data ﬂow information, MUD- 
FLOW improves the performance of malware identiﬁcation by a 
large amount. However, unlike the implementation of CHABADA, 
they do not take apps’ descriptions into consideration. Therefore, in 
this paper, we take into account both the aforementioned features 
(descriptions and sensitive data ﬂow information) to implement a 
topic-speciﬁc approach, mining topic-speciﬁc data ﬂow signatures 
within an attempt to have a deeper insight into malicious apps. In- 
formation gain is further leveraged by our approach to differentiate 
malicious apps from benign apps. 
Aside from the two recent works highlighted above, there are 
also other studies related to malware identiﬁcation and detec- 
tion [1,40–43] . As examples, Kirat and Vigna propose an automatic 
technique MALGENE for extracting analysis evasion signatures [40] . 
They leverage a combination of data mining and data ﬂow anal- 
ysis techniques to automatically identify evasive behavior in the 
call events, as more and more malware can now be aware of the 
presence of the analysis environment (in order to evade detec- 
tion). Zhou et al. propose a permission-based behavioral footprint- 
ing scheme to detect known malware and a heuristics-based ﬁlter- 
ing scheme to detect unknown malware [41] . In the ﬁrst scheme, 
they detect malicious apps based on the inherent Android per- 
missions and malware-speciﬁc behavioral footprints. In the second 
scheme, they ﬁrst deﬁne suspicious behaviors from possibly mali- 
cious apps and then use them to detect suspect apps. Christodor- 
escu et al. present an automatic technique to mine speciﬁcations 
of malicious behavior [42] . They compare the execution behaviors 
of a known malware against those of a set of benign apps so that 
the malicious behaviors present in the malware but not in the be- 
nign apps can be mined. Li et al. investigate a new feature set for 
malware detection [43] . The feature set is based on the sensitive 
data-ﬂows that involve Android inter-component communications. 
Allix et al. conduct an analysis of a large set of malware and be- 
nign applications from the Android ecosystem [1] . Their study has 
reported precious insights on the writing process of Android mal- 
ware and built a malware detection scheme based on these in- 
sights. 
5.2. Studies leveraging topic model 
The most related works to ours are the recent study by 
Panichella et al. [7] . Panichella et al. introduce a novel solution 
named LDA-GA to use topic models for software engineering tasks 
more effectively [7] . They use Genetic Algorithm (GA) to search for 
a near optimal conﬁguration for Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), 
which lead to better performances on different software engineer- 
ing tasks. In our paper, we use their algorithm as a sub step to 
determine a proper number of app categories. 
There are also a large number of software engineering studies 
that have leveraged topic model [44–54] to achieve their function- 
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ality. For example, Nguyen et al. propose an automated approach 
called BugScout to help developers reduce buggy code locating ef- 
forts by narrowing the search space of buggy ﬁles [44] . They de- 
velop a specialized topic model to correlate bug reports and the 
corresponding buggy ﬁles via their shared topics. In a later work, 
Nguyen et al. introduce a novel approach called DBTM, which again 
leverages topic model, to detect duplicate bug reports [45] . Their 
approach that combines both information retrieval and topic mod- 
eling techniques have taken the advantages of both IR-based fea- 
tures and topic-based features. Lukins et al. present a static LDA- 
based technique for automatic bug localization [46] . Their study 
shows that the performance of the LDA-based technique is neither 
affected by the size of the software system nor by the stability of 
the source code base. 
6. Conclusion and future work 
We have proposed to mine topic-speciﬁc sensitive data ﬂow 
signatures to improve malware characterization. Our approach ﬁrst 
groups different apps into several clusters (i.e., topics) according to 
their descriptions using an advanced topic model. Then, we gen- 
erate topic-speciﬁc signatures by computing the information gain 
ratio for each data ﬂow pattern seen in the apps from this topic. 
Empirical investigation with 3691 benign apps and 1612 malicious 
apps reveal that these signatures can indeed help better charac- 
terize malicious behavior. In future work, we plan to put signiﬁ- 
cant effort to collect more datasets and further assess the power 
of topic-speciﬁc signatures for ﬁne-grained malware identiﬁcation. 
Replication package. The source code and datasets of our work 
are available in: “https://github.com/goddding/IST ”. 
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